Are Beijing-Islamabad ties under strain? Last month’s bombing near Karachi airport, which killed two Chinese engineers and wounded a third, may well be a turning point. These bombings, claimed by the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), were the latest in a string of attacks on Beijing’s interests in Pakistan, which began in 2016. They have angered China, which has pushed Pakistan to begin formal negotiations for a joint security management system.
Last Monday, the Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson said that Beijing “will continue supporting Pakistan’s counterterrorism effort[s] and socioeconomic development”. Pakistani officials who have direct knowledge of the previously unreported negotiations told Reuters that the Chinese want to bring in their own security, something that Pakistan is not in support of. Beijing has sent Islamabad a written proposal to “allow the dispatch of security agencies and military forces into each other’s territory to assist in counterterrorism missions and conduct joint strikes”.
Pakistan, for its part, was amenable to setting up a joint security management system wherein Chinese officials could attend security meetings. It had also requested Beijing for greater help in improving its intelligence capabilities instead of direct involvement. But, it remains averse to having Chinese security and military forces on its territory.
Why China Is Frustrated
China does not seem to be in the mood to be placated—and not without reason. Two major deadly attacks have occurred this year—one was in October last month in Karachi, and another in March in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). The latter attack, on a Chinese envoy, was carried out by affiliates of Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and resulted in the deaths of five Chinese nationals working on the Dasu dam project.
Following the October bombings, the Chinese response was unusually blunt. It has been pushing for a thorough probe and investigation into the attacks as well as for a large-scale counterterrorism operation. The Chinese embassy, strongly condemning the “terrorist attack”, recently requested Pakistan to “thoroughly investigate the attack, severely punish the perpetrators, and take all necessary measures to protect the safety of Chinese citizens, institutions and projects in Pakistan”, and asked “Chinese citizens, enterprises and projects in Pakistan to be vigilant, pay close attention to the security situation, strengthen security measures, and make every effort to take safety precautions”. This is not surprising because these two attacks are certainly not the only ones targeting Chinese interests and personnel in Pakistan.
The Balochistan Conflict
The roots of these tensions go back to Baloch dissatisfaction. However, the other broad underlying factor is Pakistan’s inability to assimilate all its ethnic groups and provinces into a cohesive national identity, both culturally and economically. The narrative of Pakistani Balochistan follows a familiar trajectory. It has been seen earlier in the history of East Pakistan (which ultimately decided its destiny as Bangladesh), of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, and of the Northwest Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). The steady depletion of natural resources of these provinces, the dispossession of their populaces, the erosion of local autonomy, negligence towards development, the suppression of ethnic identity and culture, demographic changes and the brutal crushing of any dissent or opposition are all-too-familiar patterns.
Balochistan is a resource-rich province with natural gas and mineral deposits, including coal, chromites, barytes, sulphur, marble, iron ore, quartzite, uranium, limestone and 95% of the world’s asbestos. Nevertheless, the province continues to languish under neglect, with the Baloch people alleging internal colonisation by Pakistan’s dominant Punjab province. The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) continues to press ahead with its demands for secessionism, with Pakistan launching large-scale anti-insurgency operations to crush the agitation. Hundreds of Baloch have lost their lives and many more “disappeared” under these operations.
Why CPEC Has Become A Bone Of Contention
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the flagship programme of China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), passes majorly through Balochistan and is meant to bring in all the fruits of development. But the project has added to Baloch anxiety. The CPEC, a network of road, rail, power grid and cable connections, links China’s Xinjiang to the Gwadar Port in Balochistan Province. The Baloch allege dissatisfaction with and exploitation by the CPEC, whereby thousands have been displaced on their own land without adequate compensation or employment opportunities. There are charges of corruption and ambiguity, with many believing that only Pakistani elites and China would benefit from the project. The result has been a string of attacks on Chinese personnel and interests, interrupting the implementation of the CPEC. For instance, in 2018, the BLA attacked the Chinese consulate in Karachi. Two years later, it attacked the Pakistan Stock Exchange, where the Chinese are major investors. In 2022, a female Baloch suicide bomber targeted Karachi University, killing three Chinese teachers. Last year, the BLA set six Chinese mobile towers on fire.
These tensions have considerably slowed down the progress of the CPEC, with many projects having been stalled. The Chinese, who have invested almost $64 billion into the corridor, are visibly upset. In 2021, a Pakistan Senate panel expressed concern over the slow progress of the CPEC and the Chinese dissatisfaction, given that around 135 Chinese companies are engaged in the CPEC. The Chinese Ambassador in Islamabad had also complained that Pakistan had “destroyed CPEC”.
A Breakdown Of Ties?
Along with the stalled projects and lost profits, body bags containing the remains of Chinese workers returning to the country have added to China’s frustrations. This has led to pressure on Islamabad to launch a full-blown counterinsurgency operation in Balochistan. It has also contributed to the erosion of confidence and a possible devaluation of bilateral ties with Pakistan. Analysts have pointed out that in the last few joint statements—most notable being the latest one released during the visit of Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif to China—Pakistan is no longer mentioned as a “highest priority” country for China, a tag that featured in previous joint statements. Also, the idea of extending the CPEC to Afghanistan—mooted during a trilateral meeting in 2023 between then-Pakistani foreign minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, Chinese foreign minister Qin Gang, and acting Afghan foreign minister Malawi Amir Khan Muttaqi—is no longer being discussed.
Pakistan neither wants to engage in another massive counterterrorism operation nor does it want Chinese security forces to guard CPEC projects. Yet, $30 billion of its $126-billion total external foreign debt is owed to China. It is also seeking another $7 billion from the International Monetary Fund. Not a pretty picture: not for Pakistan, not for China, and certainly not for the CPEC.
(Aditi Bhaduri is a journalist and political analyst. She has translated the works of Nicholas Roerich from Russian to English)
Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author